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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical studies on the professionalization of parties often suffer from a lack of data. 
However, this analysis of Belgian parties’ human capital is based on reliable data derived from 
annual financial statements and covers a sixteen-year period (1999 to 2014). Based on earlier 
studies, we tested five hypotheses addressing increasing professionalization and inter-party 
differences concerning staff size. The analysis shows that Belgian parties didn’t grow more 
capital-intensive during the studied period but remained relatively stable. With the exception 
of the Green party family, left-oriented parties were more capital-intensive than parties on the 
right. Our data also show a positive relationship between electoral strength and organization: 
the larger a parties’ vote share, the more it relies on human capital. New parties tend to rely 
less on human capital than traditional parties and they are more prone to organizational 
instability due to electoral change. Finally, the analysis suggests that the federalized Belgian 
party system has created separate environments for party organizations, as Francophone 
prove more capital-intensive than their Flemish counterparts.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scholars of party organizations label present-day political parties as capital-intensive electoral 
machines (Krouwel, 2012; Mair, Müller, & Plasser, 2004; Scarrow & Webb, 2013). This evolution 
towards electoral-professionalism has increased the importance of staff within the inner workings of 
party organizations (Mancini, 1999; Panebianco, 1988). Political officials and office-holders are assisted 
by a variety of political aids, ranging from strategists to fundraisers and policy advisors. This process of 
professionalization has been reinforced by the dropping membership rates of political parties: while 
party members could initially serve as volunteers supporting the party organization, these diminishing 
free labor forces were replaced by paid employees. 
 
Yet despite the relevance of the subject, research on the staff of political parties remains scarce (Webb 
& Kolodny, 2006). A few notable exceptions aside (Katz & Mair, 1992; Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke, 
Scarrow, & Webb, 2016), gathering data on party staff has proven itself a difficult endeavor. Parties 
appear to be very reluctant towards sharing information about their human capital. In the Belgian case, 
however, the annual financial statements of the parties offer a unique opportunity: during a sixteen-
year period, from 1999 to 2014, these statements contained reliable data on staff levels and staff 
expenses. Taking these data as a starting point, this paper deals with an often overlooked aspect of 
political parties’ infrastructure. It offers a descriptive analysis of the trends that took place during the 
studied period and compares parties based on ideology, strength, age and party system. Our analysis 
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relies on absolute indicators (staff figures, staff expenses) and considers their relation with the 
organizational strength of parties (members, total expenditure).  
 
In what follows, we first introduce the existing literature on political professionalism, followed by a 
discussion of the determinants of party staff levels. After focusing on our data and method, we turn 
towards our empirical analysis. First, we investigate whether general trends have taken place between 
1999 and 2014. Second, our theoretical discussion is translated in a comparison based on party family, 
party strength, party age and party system. In doing so, we will address two research questions: 
 
- Which trends characterize the evolution of political professionalism within Belgian parties 
between 1999 and 2014? 
- Which differences in political professionalism can be observed between parties based on 
ideology, strength, age and party system? 
 
2. Political professionalism: operationalization and determinants 
 
Although the approach of this paper is mainly exploratory, we identify the relevant aspects to the study 
of political parties’ human capital on the basis of previous research, both theoretical and empirical. In 
recent decades, literature on professionalization has gradually emerged and expanded. In this context, 
political party staff has also received some attention. We now address two central issues from the 
existing literature. First, we discuss how research on party staff relates to the concept of political 
professionalism. Second, we identify four key determinants that possibly explain differences between 
parties’ staff data.  
 
2.1. Party staff and the concept of professionalization 
 
The study of party staff is inherently linked to the concept of political professionalism. Therefore, we 
first consider how political parties’ human capital relates to this larger concept. Professionalization has 
been approached from several angles: from the remuneration and career patterns of political officials 
(Weber, 1921) to the diffusion of campaigning practices (Gibson, 2009). Yet our interest lies elsewhere: 
the importance of paid personnel within party organizations. For some authors, however, 
professionalism doesn’t just concern any kind of staff. Panebianco (1988), whose seminal work 
distinguished between bureaucrats and professionals, assigned a specific meaning to ‘the political 
professional’. In contrast to bureaucrats, the author envisioned professionals to have a higher 
economic status, have a better education, to serve as an expert within the organization and to be more 
3 
 
independent from political leadership. From this point of view, the process of increasing 
professionalism (cf. professionalization) is about a specific type of political employee becoming more 
central to the functioning of parties (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). Such a conceptual framework entails 
an aspect of quality: it addresses staff members through individual characteristics like expertise, 
seniority et cetera.  In this study, we will not discriminate between different types of employees: such 
individual data are hard to obtain, even elementary staff data are often lacking. By relying on staff size, 
our analysis considers the quantitative aspect of party staff.  This approach is in accordance with earlier 
international-comparative studies (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016). We 
acknowledge that staff size is only a robust indicator/proxy of political professionalism. Therefore, 
rather than equating staff with professionalism, we address the capital intensity and the human capital 
of parties when applying staff data as an empirical indicator. In this way, party staff can give us a better 
insight in the human capital of political parties, and hence in the degree of professionalism. Regardless 
of conceptual approaches, literature on party organization often assumes increasing professionalism 
(professionalization). Therefore, our first hypothesis states the following: 
 
H1: Belgian political parties have grown more capital-intensive between 1999 and 2014. 
 
2.2. Determinants of staff levels 
 
Based on an international-comparative study, Poguntke et al. (2016) concluded that country effects 
are best at explaining variation in staff figures. Several elements might explain these effects. First, 
these systemic differences could be attributed to political finance regimes, as some nations might 
subsidize their political parties more generously than others. Second, international patterns might be 
connected to institutional characteristics (e.g. the electoral, political or media system), since they 
determine the structure of interparty competition. Such a hypothesis shows parallels to how Farrell 
(1996) theorized about differences in campaign professionalization: he expects the phenomenon to be 
the greatest in presidential and majoritarian systems with high popular access to a commercialized 
media market. Third, the observed national uniformity could also be linked to contagion effects within 
party systems, with parties copying each other’s behavior or organizational structure. Similarly, 
existing models of party transformation (e.g. professionalization) argue that parties will adapt to 
innovations of others when they are perceived as a competitive advantage (Appleton & Ward, 1997; 
Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988; Wilson, 1980). 
 
In addition to the impact of systemic variables, scholars have observed an effect of party ideology 
(Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016; Smulders, 2016). On a theoretical level, the existing literature 
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offers an ambiguous picture. Gibson & Rommele’s (2001) party-centered theory of campaign 
professionalized campaigning followed Epstein’s idea of professionalization being a “contagion from 
the right” (1980). On the other hand, the electoral-professional party described by Panebianco (1988) 
was envisaged as the successor of mass parties from social- and Christian democratic traditions. Up to 
this point, empirical studies have shown leftist and Christian democratic parties to be more 
professionalized (Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016; Stromback, 2009; Tenscher & Mykkanen, 
2014). Similarly, Smulders (2016) observed that communist, ecologist, social- and Christian democratic 
families spend a significantly higher share of their resources on staff. We follow this train of thought 
for our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Left-oriented parties have a more capital-intensive organization than parties on the 
right.  
 
We argue that party strength is another potential explanatory variable. Since parties are generally 
subsidized on the basis of their electoral strength (Ohman, 2012), we argue that party strength 
(operationalized by vote share) might have an impact in nations where parties depend heavily on state 
funding, such as Belgium (Van Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). Moreover, stronger parties can probably rely 
on a larger sum of membership fees and donations. As political parties might employ staff in proportion 
to the resources available to them, this determinant could certainly have an effect on a parties’ 
organizational infrastructure.  
 
H3: Parties with strong electoral support are more capital-intensive than parties with less 
electoral support.  
 
Our last potential determinant is party age. On this front, existing literature can be interpreted from 
two angles. The first approach is based on existing models of party transformation and assumes that 
older organizations are more elaborated. Moreover, this assumption is supported by empirical study 
on parties’ staff expenses (Smulders, 2016). The underlying idea is that party age serves as a proxy for 
institutionalization, with older parties having a larger, more developed organizational infrastructure. 
For this reason, we expect traditional parties to be more capital-intensive when the quantitative aspect 
of professionalism (staff size) is concerned. The second approach relies on the qualitative aspect of 
professionalism within parties. It rather addresses the presence of certain practices and individual staff 
profiles, expecting newer parties to show a more professional infrastructure. For example, theories of 
party transformation argue that age results in a form of organizational inertia, with innovations (e.g. 
professionalization) meeting a wall of resistance (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Describing the business firm 
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party, Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) have argued that this does not apply to newer parties. Unimpeded 
by a stable party infrastructure, business firm parties embody “the electoral-professional model of 
party organisation (…) taken to its logical conclusion” (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999, p. 311). We therefore 
expect the staff of newer parties to show more qualitative aspects of professionalism, leading to higher 
remuneration. 
 
H4: Traditional parties have a more capital-intensive organization than newer parties.  
H5: Employees of newer parties have a more professional profile than those working for 
traditional parties, resulting in a higher cost per staff member.   
 
3. Data and method 
 
While studies on party staff generally suffer from a lack of data, our analysis is built upon reliable and 
up-to-date data on staff levels and staff expenses originating from the financial statements of the 
Belgian political parties. Since 1989, all parties represented in the Belgian federal Parliament are 
required to submit a yearly report on their finances, including revenues, expenses and assets. As a 
result, we have detailed data on the financial situation of Belgian political parties for a period of more 
than 25 years. However, only since 1999 these financial reports are comparable between parties and 
over time. Only at that time the legislator determined a fixed list of party units whose finances had to 
be included in the financial statements (e.g. study centers, regional or provincial branches), while 
previously parties could freely decide on which units to include (Maddens, Smulders, Wolfs, & 
Weekers, 2016) Moreover, party staff figures are only part of the statements from 1999 onwards.1 
Since 2015, however, revised legislation applies, as a result of which staff figures are currently no 
longer mentioned in the financial statements. We therefore have data on staff levels and staff 
expenses for a sixteen-year period (1999-2014). In this study, we only examine the ten parties which 
had to file a report annually during this complete time period.2 This leads to a dataset containing 160 
individual observations. 
 
                                                          
1 These staff figures only include the staff members on the payroll of the party, i.e. party staff employed and paid 
for by the party itself. These figures do not include staff members provided and paid for by the different 
Parliaments (e.g. MPs’ personal staff and party group staff) and external consultants. 
2 These parties are Agalev/Groen!/Groen, CVP/CD&V, Ecolo, PRL/MR, PS, PSC/CdH, SP/Sp.a(-spirit), Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang, VLD/Open Vld and VU/N-VA. 
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Based on these annual financial statements, we relied on five indicators for our analysis. First, there is 
staff size containing all employees who are directly on the party payroll. These staff members often 
include personnel working at the party headquarters, study center and regional branches. Note that 
staff members who are funded through indirect public resources (e.g. parliamentary or cabinet 
funding) are not included, neither are external consultants. Our second indicator is staff expenses, 
which represents the total amount of financial resources dedicated to staff on the party payroll. Exactly 
similar staff size, the same employees are included in this variable, while others are not counted. As 
these key indicators are derived from a source with a consistent format, we argue that they offer the 
best achievable data on the presence of human capital at Belgium’s ten main parties. While staff size 
illustrates how much full time equivalents (from now on FTE) are employed through party means, staff 
expenses demonstrate how much a party spent on human capital in a given year. 
 
Table 1: Description and operationalization of quantitative indicators for human capital of parties 
 Description Operationalization 
Staff size Degree of human 
capital intensity, 
measured by the 
absolute number of 
employees. 
 
Number of full-time 
equivalents (FTE’s) on 
party payroll. 
 
Staff expenses Degree of human 
capital intensity, 
measured by the 
absolute amount of 
financial resources 
dedicated to staff. 
 
Financial resources 
spent on staff by party 
(expressed in €).  
 
Staff/Members The organizational 
balance between 
paid collaborators 
and volunteers.  
Staff size divided by 
number of party 
members, multiplied by 
thousand. 
 
Share of staff 
expenses 
The percentage of 
financial resources 
spent on human 
capital.  
 
Staff expenses divided 
by total expenses.  
FTE cost The average cost of 
one FTE.  
Staff expenses divided 
by staff size. 
 
 
 
 Although most of our analysis will focus on our core indicators, we calculated three extra variables to 
support our analysis. To complement staff size, we weighed staff in relation to membership using a 
staff-member ratio. In concreto, we calculated how much staff are employed for every thousand 
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members that adhere to a certain party. Membership data for this indicator were derived from the 
MAPP project (van Haute, 2014; 2015). The interpretation of this indicator is connected to the 
evolution from labor-intensive to capital-intensive party organization. The higher the value of a party 
on this indicator, the further it is supposed to be removed from the ideal type of the mass membership 
party. From this point of view, the staff-member ratio, measures the distance between a party 
organization and its supposed social roots. As a result, this balance offers clues about the equilibrium 
(or lack thereof) between the day-to-day functioning of a party and its supporting members.  
 
While the staff-member ratio clarifies an additional aspect of the organizational side of human capital, 
we rely on two extra indicators to make sense of the financial side to party staff. The share of staff 
expenses identifies the percentage of financial resources that are spent on staff by a given party. These 
values shed a light on the importance of the staff body for parties, regardless of the size of resources 
– allowing us to compare large and small parties. Our fifth and last indicator is cost per FTE, in which 
we combine the two key indicators: staff expenses and staff size. It registers how much a given party 
spent on average for every employee and allows us to observe which parties pay less or more. The 
motivation behind this indicator goes beyond the height of salaries, we aim to find out what kind of 
staff members are employed by the different parties. Indirectly, this indicator offers us information an 
the individual characteristics of professionals we discussed above. The higher the average cost per FTE, 
the more professionals (as opposed to bureaucrats) are active within a party organization. From that 
perspective, these data complement staff size (adressing the quantity of staff) by drawing attention to 
the quality of staff members. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. General trends: rising professionalism? 
 
How has political professionalism evolved in Belgium between 1999 and 2014? As political scientists 
often consider professionalism to be ever increasing, we start our empirical analysis by testing this 
basic assumption. We analyze potential trends along five indicators related to political professionalism. 
Two of these variables are absolute (staff figures, staff expenses3), while the other three are relative 
indicators (FTE/1000 members, share of staff expenses, cost per FTE). All values should be interpreted 
as aggregates representing the sum of all ten parties included in our analysis. As illustrated by the staff 
numbers (Table 2), the total amount of Belgian party staff remained relatively stable. The sum of 
political collaborators directly employed by Belgian parties fluctuated between 325 and 379, showing 
                                                          
3 All monetary values in our analysis are expressed in euro and indexed, expressed in prices of October 2016. 
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no clear overall trend of increase or decrease. These staff size data do not support our first hypothesis, 
as we anticipated that Belgian parties would have grown more capital-intensive between 1999 and 
2014.  
 
However, staff expenses (our second key indicator) did undergo considerable evolution. Intuitively, 
one would expect the evolution of staff expenses to follow the same pattern as staff figures. Although 
this parallel holds for the period between 2000 and 2008, staff costs start to break away from staff 
figures in 2009 and keep increasing. This decoupling between staff and staff expenses is illustrated in 
Graph 1. As the share of staff expenses suggests, parties were not necessarily compelled to dig deeper 
into their pockets. They constantly spent 25 to 30 percent of their expenses to personnel. An analysis 
of party-specific evolutions in staff expenses illustrated that the lion share of this trend was caused by 
evoltions within a single party (PS). Therefore, we argue that the increase in staff expenses should not 
be considered a general trend.   
 
Table 2: Staff numbers, number of members, number of FTEs per 1000 members, staff expenses (indexed), 
share of staff expenses and cost per FTE (indexed); aggregate numbers for all ten parties, 1999-2014. 
 Organization Finance 
 Staff Members 
Staff / 
Members 
Staff 
Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses 
FTE cost 
1999 341 462.404 0,74 24.833.644 28 75.400 
2000 325 455.392 0,71 19.637.274 29 65.551 
2001 368 427.214 0,86 19.223.781 24 59.445 
2002 368 405.026 0,91 20.302.476 25 66.853 
2003 397 396.560 1,00 19.900.646 20 59.662 
2004 358 390.422 0,92 19.773.401 22 62.100 
2005 342 401.884 0,85 19.240.901 25 63.094 
2006 357 411.141 0,87 19.298.687 21 55.598 
2007 341 381.377 0,89 20.543.344 22 61.618 
2008 332 374.359 0,89 19.506.120 23 74.815 
2009 348 364.524 0,95 21.440.035 23 69.969 
2010 351 368.480 0,95 21.732.297 23 74.064 
2011 344 373.234 0,92 21.947.863 27 74.212 
2012 365 382.752 0,95 24.320.665 27 74.424 
2013 379 378.317 1,00 25.496.246 31 72.998 
2014 379 380.817 1,00 26.116.082 28 73.933 
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Graph 1: Staff numbers (left axis) and staff expenses (indexed, right axis),  
aggregate numbers for all ten parties, 1999-2014.  
 
 
Similar to staff expenses, staff-member ratios also went up despite staff sizes remaining stable. While 
parties only employed about 0,74 FTE for every 1000 members in 1999, that figure rose to 1,00 FTE for 
every 1000 members in 2014. This trend can be attributed to the continuing erosion of party 
membership, which amplified the weight of paid personnel within party organization. Again, this 
observation should not alter our interpretation of the first hypothesis, which was disconfirmed by the 
stability of general staff size during the studied period. 
 
4.2. Exploring interparty differences 
 
Until now, we have only examined the aggregate staff levels and expenses of all ten parties in our 
dataset. It can be expected, however, that substantial differences exist between the parties, not only 
with respect to the size of their staff numbers and expenses, but also regarding their evolution through 
time. Therefore, we now make a more in-depth assessment of the parties separately. On the basis of 
the insights discussed in the theoretic section, we now analyze whether certain party characteristics 
and systemic features influence the staff levels and staff expenses of the Belgian political parties.  
 
Taking a first look at interparty differences, a wide range of variation stands out. As we observe the 
party averages for the period 1999-2014 for our key variables in Table 3, differences are generally quite 
large. As one compares the average staff size of Vlaams Belang (4,67 FTE) with PS (76,71 FTE), it is 
evident that the inner workings of these party organizations bear little resemblance. Based on these 
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nominal staff figures, we can observe three more or less separated categories of parties4. The first 
category, consisting of CdH and the socialist party family, employs the largest amount staff. The middle 
category harbors CD&V and the liberal party family, while the green party family, N-VA and Vlaams 
Belang have the smallest bodies of staff. Not surprisingly, these patterns largely correspond to 
differences between parties concerning staff expenses. Again, the category of ‘big spenders’ consists 
of socialists and Christian democrats, headed by PS. In the middle category, the liberal parties are 
joined by CdH and Ecolo. Groen, N-VA and Vlaams Belang spend the smallest amount of resources on 
staff.  
 
Turning our attention towards evolutions between 1999 and 2014, we observe that most of these 
interparty differences are consistent through time (Graph 2). However, some parties took on new 
positions. CdH changed gear in 2001, joining the socialist party family in the upper category. N-VA 
followed a similar strategy following its landslide victory in 2010. The party headed towards joining the 
liberal party family and CD&V in the middle category. Ecolo is characterized by a slow but steady 
growth of its staff infrastructure. PS is a peculiar case: although the party retained a stable staff level, 
it invested quite heavily in staff remuneration after 2010. Sp.a carried out a gradual downsizing 
operation after 2001.  
 
Table 3: Staff numbers, number of members, number of FTEs per 1000 members, staff expenses (indexed), 
share of staff expenses and cost per FTE (indexed), averages for all ten parties, 1999-2014. 
 Organization Finance 
 
Staff Members 
Staff / 
Members 
Staff 
Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses 
FTE cost 
CVP/CD&V5 44 80.008 0,57 3.047.131 28 70.385 
VLD/Open Vld 32 70.313 0,46 2.151.246 26 68.947 
SP/Sp.a 61 58.571 1,06 3.005.902 30 48.921 
Agalev/Groen!/Groen 10 5.888 1,67 819.779 19 77.412 
Vlaams Blok/Belang 5 19.213 0,27 312.650 4 57.350 
VU/N-VA 10 18.671 0,60 776.727 19 72.215 
PS 77 87.773 0,88 4.952.229 36 65.234 
PRL/MR 37 30.732 1,26 2.203.032 22 58.635 
PSC/CdH 62 21.314 3,11 2.115.268 32 34.754 
Ecolo 18 4.637 3,98 2.061.626 33 117.675 
 
                                                          
4 This is  illustrated by the trimodal distribution of the histogram for this variable (see: appendix) 
5 For the financial indicators, no party-specific data for CD&V and N-VA exist for 2007 and 2008. These parties 
submitted a combined annual account during this two-year period, since they formed an electoral cartel. 
11 
 
Graph 2: Staff figures, Flemish parties and Francophone parties separately, 1999-2014. 
 
4.2.1. Ideology: left vs. right 
 
Our observations support the idea that ideology has an impact on how parties deal with their human 
capital. Socialist and Christian democratic parties employ the largest number of staff. This corroborates 
with existing empirical studies (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Krouwel, 2012; Smulders, 2016) and 
Panebianco’s (1988) hypothesis. Moreover, the intensity of a party organization’s human capital drops 
as a party’s ideological position moves to the right. The liberal party family populates the middle 
category and N-VA and Vlaams Belang have a smaller staff infrastructure. These findings meet our 
expectations, as the second hypothesis stated that leftist parties would have a more capital-intensive 
organization than parties on the right.  However, the greens seem to be an exception to this rule. Groen 
and Ecolo combine the most leftist position on the left-right continuum for our cases (Döring & Manow, 
2016) with relatively small bodies of staff.  
 
Since the position of the Green parties within their party system is far from dominant, we expected 
that this anomaly might disappear if one accounts for their smaller scale. For example, a different 
picture arises when we observe the share of staff expenses. Ecolo dedicated a third of its financial 
resources to staff, which is very similar to big spenders like PS and CdH. Such a spending pattern does 
correspond to what we might expect from the parties’ ideological outlook. However, Groen only spent 
a fifth of its resources on human capital (similar to N-VA and MR), which might be explained by the 
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severe cutbacks the party made after its electoral defeat in 2003. As this illustrates the interplay 
between electoral performance, resources and staff size, the influence of party strength will be 
analyzed in the next section. As for the impact of ideology on human capital, we argue that the second 
hypothesis is supported by our data, but only partially.  
 
4.2.2. Party strength 
 
From an international perspective, Belgian parties derive an exceptionally large share of their financial 
resources from public funding (Van Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). As a result, stronger parties have more 
financial resources at their disposal. They not only receive higher amounts of public funding, but they 
can also rely on financial support from members and donors. As a result, we expect that stronger 
parties have more financial leeway to employ staff members on the long term. We operationalize this 
variable by using a parties’ electoral share, based on the most recent federal or regional elections. 
Graph 3 offers a view on the relationship between staff size and party strength.  
 
Graph 3: Staff figures according to party strength and ideology, all parties separately, 1999-2014. 
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As one might expect, the relation is positive and significant: greater electoral weight clearly 
corresponds to a larger staff size (Pearson’s r = 0,53, p < 0,01). Differences in electoral weight account 
for 28 percent of the variance in the staff size of the parties included in our analysis (R² = 0,28). As a 
result, the third hypothesis is supported by our findings. At the same time, the scatterplot illustrates 
the combined effect of electoral strength and ideology: parties and party families remain clustered in 
the same area. Furthermore, the three categories we described earlier (high, medium and low staff 
levels) maintain a distinct profile. The upper category of parties with a large staff size (PS, CdH and 
Sp.a) lies above the trend line, employing more staff than we would expect from their electoral 
strength. The middle category (MR, CD&V and Open Vld) sticks to the trend line. A few exceptions 
aside, parties with a smaller amount of employees (Groen, Ecolo, Vlaams Belang and N-VA) have even 
less staff than one can expect from their electoral weight.  
 
In contrast to the other determinants we analyzed, party strength shows variation through time. Party 
age and party system are indisputably fixed attributes and we don’t expect big ideological shifts to 
have taken place between 1999 and 2014. This allows us to assess the dynamic impact of electoral 
performance on staff size, since they both show variation throughout the studied period. How do 
parties adjust their human capital to changes brought by the electoral cycle?  
 
In theory, three different ideal type strategies can be distinguished: 
- Procyclical: a party follows the ups and downs of its own electoral performance. 
- Countercyclical: a party takes the opposite approach, limiting staff during electoral highs and 
investing extra during electoral lows. 
- Stability: a party builds a stable staff infrastructure that is not prone to electoral shifts.  
 
The staff evolutions in Graph 2 already offer indications: some parties retain a relatively stable staff 
size (Sp.a, CD&V, Open Vld, PS, and MR), while others do not (Groen, N-VA, Vlaams Belang, Ecolo and 
CdH). To assess these different reactions, we plotted staff size against electoral performance for all ten 
parties included in our study (only shown for N-VA and Vlaams Belang in Graph 4). The strategy of PS 
and MR seems to approach stability the best: fluctuations in their staff size do not follow an election-
connected pattern. The behavior of Flemish traditional parties is mostly stable, although they gradually 
adjusted their staff size to shrinking electoral weights towards the end of our studied period. The 
rollercoaster-esque developments of N-VA (Graph 4) and Groen are unambiguous examples of the 
procyclical approach. Having absorbed staff on the party payroll that was previously employed through 
parliamentary resources, VB is the only clear-cut counterpart that opted for the countercyclical option. 
Although more stable, CdH and Ecolo also show signs of a countercyclical approach. Regardless of 
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electoral setbacks, both parties continued to grow their staff size. Especially CdH stands out, as it 
invested firmly in staff infrastructure after the 1999 electoral defeat.  
 
Graph 4: Vote share (left axis) and staff figures (right axis) for N-VA (procyclical) and VB (countercyclical), 1999-2014. 
  
 
We must be cautious not to present these different strategies as voluntary choices made by political 
parties. We rather argue that most parties prefer organizational stability but that not all of them have 
the luxury of resources to sustain such a staff infrastructure. From that point of view, interesting 
differences remain between the different party ages and party systems included in this analysis. 
 
4.2.3. Party age: traditional vs. non-traditional 
 
Our analysis distinguishes between traditional and non-traditional parties, based on the year in which 
the party organization was founded. While we recognize that other “degrees of newness” 
(Deschouwer, 2008) exist (e.g. ideology), we think that age is the best indicator for newness when 
analyzing party organizations. Whether we use 1950 (Beyens, Lucardie, & Deschouwer, 2016) or 1968 
(Bolleyer, 2013) as a cut-off point, it results in the exact same classification between the traditional 
ideologies (Christian democratic, socialist and liberal) and the non-traditional parties (Ecolo, Groen, 
Vlaams Belang and N-VA). As the imperative of the mass party model looms large in Belgium 
(Deschouwer, 2012), we wanted to assess to what extent newer parties represent a distinct category.  
Judging from our core indicators (staff size and staff expenses), strong organizational differences 
between the two groups remain. Traditional parties have a far more developed staff infrastructure 
(Table 4). On average, they spend three times as much resources on human capital and have staff 
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bodies four times the size of non-traditional parties. Those differences go beyond mere size or electoral 
strength: traditional parties also spend a bigger share of their resources on personnel. These 
observations are in line with our original expectations: data on both key indicators (staff size and staff 
expenses) support hypothesis four. Based on existing literature, our interpretation is that the 
organizational inertia of traditional parties results in a larger staff size, combining bureaucratic (mass 
party) staff with electoral-professional employees. In contrast, non-traditional parties exhibit a 
smaller, “lean and mean” organization, relying mostly on electoral-professional collaborators.  
Table 4: Staff numbers, number of members, number of FTEs per 1000 members,  
staff expenses (indexed), share of staff expenses and cost per FTE (indexed), averages, 1999-2014. 
 Organization Finance 
 Staff Members 
Staff / 
Members 
Staff Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses 
FTE cost 
Traditional 52 58.118 0,90 2.930.567 29 57.510 
Non-traditional 11 12.102 0,87 968.423 19 81.135 
 
Yet one indicator shows a peculiar parallel: traditional and non-traditional parties have a surprisingly 
similar staff-to-member ratio. We expected to find two different structural balances, reflecting a 
cleavage between labor-intensive (traditional) and capital-intensive (non-traditional) organizations. 
These anticipated differences in the role of mass membership and paid staff are not reflected in our 
data. In fact, the average staff-to-member ratio is very similar for both types of parties: about 0,9 FTE 
for every thousand members. However, this has not always been the case: the evolution of this 
indicator shows an interesting pattern that might help explain the apparent similarities (Graph 5).  
 
Graph 5: Staff-to-member ratio, traditional and non-traditional parties and overall mean, 1999-2014. 
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At the start of the period included in our analysis, the staff/member ratio did actually meet 
expectations. In 1999, non-traditional parties employed on average 2,7 FTE for every thousand 
members, while this was only 0,8 FTE for traditional parties. This gap narrowed through time, until 
values for non-traditional and traditional parties reached the same level in 2006, staying intertwined 
for the rest of the period included in this study.  
 
However, this does not imply that Belgian parties do not differ regarding the balance between staff 
and members. On the contrary: values range from 0,26 FTE (VB) for every thousand members to 3,98 
FTE (Ecolo). Our observations indicate that interparty differences are more fine-grained than a division 
between traditional and non-traditional parties, as illustrated by Table 3. Most parties employ less 
than one FTE for every thousand members (CD&V, N-VA, PS, Open Vld and VB), with the balance of 
Open Vld (0,46) and Vlaams Belang (0,26) being notably low. While Sp.a remains still close to one FTE 
for every thousand members and Groen stays underneath two FTEs, CdH and Ecolo employ large 
amounts of staff in contrast to their membership figures. In addition to that, the outliers (Groen, CdH 
and Ecolo) have lived through significant shifts between 1999 and 2014. Note that for the green party 
family, these movements show big shifts as their membership bases are relatively small compared to 
other parties (less than 10.000 members). For Groen, most of this movement can be attributed to 
decrease and increase in staffing, while Ecolo retained a fairly stable staff throughout the studied 
period. The first shift for CdH can be connected to an increase in staff, while the second relates to 
membership figures, which plummeted after 2010.  
 
In addition to staff and members, we also anticipated the average costs per FTE for traditional and 
non-traditional parties to differ significantly (H5). At first sight, Table 4 supports these predictions. It 
reports an average cost of 81.135 euro per FTE for non-traditional parties and a noticeably lower value 
for traditional parties (57.510 euro). Yet there are several reasons to interpret these figures with 
caution. First, party-specific averages show great discrepancies between the ten parties (Table 3). The 
majority of parties (CD&V, Open Vld, VB, N-VA, PS and MR) spent between 55.000 euro and 75.000 
euro per FTE, but our cases include strong outliers. Sp.a spends tangibly less than others (48.921 euro) 
but CdH’s average FTE only costs 34.754 euro. Although Groen’s FTE cost is somewhat higher than 
most (77.412 euro), especially Ecolo’s high average cost per FTE of 117.675 euro raises eyebrows. As a 
result, the values we obtained for traditional and non-traditional parties are influenced by their 
respective outliers. Second, the average cost per FTE cannot automatically be translated into salaries 
with corresponding staff profiles. For example, it is unclear whether parties make use of identical fiscal 
labor regimes. The low cost per FTE of some parties could be caused by employing staff through 
alternative mechanisms with lower fiscal contributions, aimed at stimulating employment. For 
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example, Sp.a consistently reported the use of such arrangements (GESCO and DAC) in previous studies 
(Noppe, 2001). In addition, party differences in salaries could still be explained by the generosity or 
wealth of specific parties and by the seniority of staff members. Based on these data, we wouldn’t  
draw sharp conclusions about hypothesis five, which anticipated that average value  of staff members 
working for their respective parties (qualitative aspect of professionalism) would be higher in new 
parties.   
 
4.2.4. Party system: Flemish vs. Francophone 
 
Do Flemish and Francophone parties approach their human capital differently? We conclude our 
empirical analysis by focusing on the two party systems that mark the Belgian political landscape. Table 
5 offers a compilation of Flemish and Francophone averages for the different indicators. Regardless of 
what aspect we pick, the data show that Francophone parties invest more heavily in human capital. 
First of all, the absolute figures on organization and finance (staff size and staff expenses) our tangibly 
higher. Using measurements that relate human capital to membership and resources (staff/member 
and share of staff expenses) produces the same results. Flemish parties employ less personnel per 
member and dedicate a smaller share of their financial resources to human capital. 
 
Table 5: Staff numbers, number of members, number of FTEs per 1000 members,  
staff expenses (indexed), share of staff expenses and cost per FTE (indexed), averages, 1999-2014. 
 Organization Finance 
 Staff Members 
Staff / 
Members 
Staff 
Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses 
FTE cost 
Flemish 27 42.111 0,64 1.687.489 21 65.233 
Francophone 48 36.114 1,34 2.833.039 31 69.075 
 
It remains unclear which factors lie beneath these apparent differences within the Belgian federalized 
party landscape. Determinants we discussed earlier, like ideology and party age, might play a role. The 
ideological outlook of the Francophone party system is more left-leaning and counts less non-
traditional parties than Flanders. The interplay between electoral performance and human capital we 
discussed could also play a role. Throughout the period we studied (1999-2014), the electoral balance 
within the Flemish party system shifted several times, causing especially the non-traditional parties 
(Groen, Vlaams Belang and N-VA) to cut down or expand staff sizes. In comparison, the Francophone 
party system shows more organizational stability.  
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Is it possible that the more atomized Flemish party landscape produces more uncertainty for party 
organizations? This could mean that the struggle for resources and organizational stability is harder 
for newcomers in competitive party systems with a larger effective number of parties. Such an effect 
might explain why the Flemish non-traditional parties experienced more ups and downs than their 
counterpart within the Francophone party system (Ecolo). The potential effect of such party system 
effects should be elaborated more specifically and could in the future be tested through international-
comparative analyses.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the staff levels and staff expenses of political parties in Belgium from 1999 
to 2014. The central focus was on the permanent staff of parties, i.e. personnel on the party payrolls, 
excluding party group staff (paid for by the parliaments) and external consultants. Our data were 
gathered from the parties’ annual financial statements. The major advantage of this approach is that 
these are official data that are comparable over time and between parties, given several legal 
obligations, while data for previous empirical studies were generally gathered by means of surveys and 
party contacts (e.g. Katz & Mair, 1992). This latter method inevitably bears a risk with regard to 
reliability and comparability of data, as it often allows parties to decide autonomously which staff 
members to include in their staff figures (such as party group staff). Therefore, although the present 
study is highly descriptive, it can nevertheless be considered as a first systematic and reliable analysis 
of political party staff in Belgium.  
 
Our analysis showed that the volume of staff (quantitative aspect of professionalism) of extra-
parliamentary parties isn’t necessarily increasing constantly: the aggregate indicators of human capital 
didn’t increase between 1999 and 2014 (H1). Although earlier empirical studies showed a clear 
increase from a historical perspective (Farrell & Webb, 2002; Krouwel, 2012), staff sizes might have 
(temporarily) reached a point of saturation in Belgium. It is unclear whether the same trend is 
applicable to parliamentary party staff in Belgium: these figures weren’t recorded in the annual 
accounts.  
   
The present study illustrated that substantial differences exist regarding staff between the ten parties 
under consideration. To start with, leftist parties did prove to have more capital-intensive 
organizations to parties on the right (H2), although this observations didn’t apply to the Green party 
family.  Moreover, we also observed an effect of party strength (H3). The vote share of parties does 
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correspond to their staff size. From a dynamic perspective, the evolution of staff tends to follow the 
evolution of the electoral results at least to some extent. If a party is confronted with an electoral 
defeat, this generally leads to a decrease of staff. More votes, on the other hand, rather result in a 
larger work force. However, this finding cannot be generalized completely, as the case of Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang clearly illustrated: this party hardly employed any staff members on its own payroll 
for years, but its recent electoral decline incited the party to hire more staff. We also  found that staff 
levels and staff expenses are generally higher amongst the traditional parties, while the non-traditional 
parties are characterized by more limited figures (H4). This should not come as a complete surprise: 
traditional parties can be seen as former mass parties, not only typified by a highly developed party 
organization, but also by some degree of organizational inertia. As a result, these parties largely 
maintain their relatively high staff levels and expenses through time, while those of the non-traditional 
parties are more limited and also more prone to short-term fluctuations.  
 
Measuring the exact impact of various determinants was beyond the scope of this study, as this would 
require more detailed explanatory research. To this end, we should ideally perform multivariate 
analyses to check the interplay between different independent variables. Given the limited number of 
individual observations in this study, however, we were unable to perform such an analysis. Moreover, 
the variation on our explanatory variables was too limited, especially with respect to the systemic 
factors. An explanatory study on party staff would therefore benefit from a higher number of 
observations from a wider range of countries. The main challenge then becomes to gather sufficient 
reliable and comparable cross-national data on staff members and expenses. Some recent initiatives 
in this direction already exist (e.g. Poguntke et al., 2016), but the results of these studies have yet to 
be seen at the moment. With this analysis of the human capital of political parties in Belgium, we 
nevertheless hope to have taken a first important step in the direction of more profound and in-depth 
research into the importance of political party staff. 
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